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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of repeated ties in the high-tech pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, a sector that is character-
izedbyastrongdualmarketstructure.Ourmostimportantﬁndingisthatprevioustiesinpairsoflargepharmaceuticalcompanies
and small biotechnology ﬁrms have a negative effect on their subsequent partnering. An explanation for this result is found in
the context of understanding the speciﬁcs of large-small coalitions in a high-tech dual market structure. Unlike what is known
about repeated ties in many other industries, this high-tech dual market structure indicates that R&D partnerships between a
small number of very large companies and a large group of dependent, small ﬁrms are not characterized by mutual dependence,
similarity, or equality.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Repeatedtiesinpairsofcooperatingcompaniesplay
an important role in the current understanding of inter-
ﬁrmpartnershipformation(seeamongstothers,Chung
et al., 2000; Ciborra, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998;
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ﬂuence the likelihood that these pairs will continue to
formpartnerships.Inordertocontributetothisbodyof
literature, our study will attempt to deepen the under-
standing of repeated ties and partnership formation by
consideringtheindustrialcontextofpairsofcompanies
in a high-tech setting.
More speciﬁcally, this paper analyzes the role of re-
peated ties in a high-tech industry with a strong dual
market structure, i.e. the international, pharmaceutical
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biotechnology industry. Such a dual market structure
is largely determined by on the one hand a group of
large,integrated,international,andestablishedcompa-
nies and on the other hand a group of relatively small,
specialized ﬁrms. The high-tech dual market structure
in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is appar-
ent in the role played by a small group of very large
pharmaceutical companies and a large group of rela-
tivelysmallbiotechnologyﬁrms(Powell,1996;Powell
et al., 2005; Saviotti, 1998). Previous research has al-
ready established that inter-ﬁrm partnering in the phar-
maceutical biotechnology industry is rather speciﬁc in
terms of the concentration of inter-ﬁrm R&D partner-
ing within these two groups of companies (Kenney,
1986; Powell, 1996; Rothaermel, 2000). To the best of
our knowledge, the current literature on the effect of
previous ties on subsequent inter-ﬁrm partnering has
paidnoattentiontothespeciﬁcsettingofadualmarket
structure in a high-tech industry. Early, seminal contri-
butions to the analysis of dual market structures, how-
ever,didrevealtheimpactofsuchmarketstructureson





inter-ﬁrm partnering might also be different from what
is known from many studies on other industries with
more evenly distributed populations of companies.
In the following section we discuss our hypothesis,
derivedfromcurrenttheory,thatstipulatestheexpected
effect of previous ties on subsequent partnering. In or-
der to test our hypothesis, we construct a panel dataset
that contains information about the partnering behav-
iorofpairsofcompanies.Inthemethodologicalsection
we discuss the data, sample, and the speciﬁc variables
we include in our panel logit models. This is followed
by sections that present and discuss the results and the
implications of our research.
2. Theory development
Our understanding of the particular industrial struc-
ture that is prevalent in the high-tech pharmaceutical
biotechnology industry and the possible implications
of such a structure for new partnership formation and
repeated ties can be clearly placed within the literature
on dual market structures (see amongst others, Averitt,
1968; Bowring, 1986; Sutton, 1992, 1998). These dual
market structures refer to highly concentrated indus-
tries with, on the one hand, a group of sizeable, center
companiesand,ontheotherhand,agroupofsmall,pe-
riphery ﬁrms holding only a very small market share.
Following this body of literature, high-tech dual
market structures are dominated by a relatively small
group of diversiﬁed companies that are very large in
terms of their economic size as measured, for instance,
bynumbersofemployees,totalassets,andyearlysales
(Averitt, 1968; Bowring, 1986). These large, well-
ﬁnanced center companies with their routinized re-
search laboratories and R&D departments are not nec-
essarily the major source of innovations in high-tech
dual market structures. Indeed, large companies often
lag behind their smaller competitors when it comes to
the introduction of major innovations. However, their
superior ﬁnancial position and their strong capabilities
inproduction,marketing,anddistributionenablelarge,
center companies to quickly transform new discover-
ies into well-established, proﬁtable products (Averitt,
1968;Sutton,1998).Thisperceptionoftheroleofcen-
ter companies resonates the classical ‘older’ Schum-
peterian understanding of the role of ‘big concerns’
(Schumpeter, 1942).
In the international, high-tech pharmaceutical
biotechnology industry, the dominance of large com-
panies, as an important characteristic of dual mar-
ket structures, is most clearly found in the important
role that large, well-funded pharmaceutical companies
play in the commercialization process of new phar-
maceutical products (see Audretsch, 2003; Arora and
Gambardella, 1990; Barley et al., 1992; Pisano, 1991;
Powell, 1996; Powell et al., 2005; Shan et al., 1994).
This refers to a relatively stable core of fewer than
100 large and very large pharmaceutical companies
that possess a signiﬁcant share of more than 80% of
the total worldwide market in pharmaceutical biotech-
nology (De Rond, 2003; OECD, 1993; OTA, 1988;
Senker, 1998; Walsh and Galimberti, 1993). These
companies with their strong ability to expand exist-
ing portfolios of pharmaceutical products have come
to dominate the commercialization process in the in-
ternational, high-tech pharmaceutical biotechnology
industry.Largecompaniesarewellknownfortheirvast
body of engineering know-how necessary for scaling
up from a laboratory setting to the actual productionN. Roijakkerset al. / Res earch Policy 34 (2005) 235–245 237
process of new therapeutic drugs. They also possess
the ‘deep pockets’ that are necessary for the extensive
and costly clinical testing required as part of the gov-
ernmentregulatoryprocessfornewdiagnosticproducts
and new therapeutic drugs. Furthermore, large compa-
nies are known for their ﬁnancial resources that en-
able them to deal with the costs of the ﬁnal stages of
commercialization and the successful worldwide mar-
ket introduction and distribution of safe and effective
pharmaceuticalproducts(Averitt,1968;Sutton,1998).
Besides the dominant role played by large compa-
nies in high-tech dual market structures, an equally
important characteristic of such industrial structures
is the presence of a large group of relatively small, ﬁ-
nancially weak, periphery ﬁrms (see amongst others,
Averitt, 1968; Bowring, 1986; Sutton, 1998). In most
contributions,thesesmall,entrepreneurialﬁrmsarede-
picted as the single most important source of new dis-
coveries in high-tech industries that are dominated by
centercompanies.However,astheirfounder-managers
typically come from the labs or science departments of
universities, many small ﬁrms lack the necessary man-
agement know-how to turn their laboratory discovery
intoaﬁnancialsuccess(Averitt,1968;Sutton,1998).In
asimilarmanner,thesesmall,R&D-intensiveﬁrmsare
usually single-product companies and their resulting
lack of production, marketing, and distribution expe-
rience seriously undermines their competitive position
in high-tech dual market structures that thrive on large
company expertise (Averitt, 1968; Bowring, 1986).
Many elements of these small, periphery ﬁrms
are clearly present in the high-tech pharmaceutical
biotechnologyindustry.Infact,inmostpublicationson
this industry (see literature reviews in De Rond, 2003;
Kenney,1986;Powell,1996;Powelletal.,1996,2005;
Senker, 1998), these small, young biotechnology ﬁrms
aredescribedashighlyinnovativeentrepreneurialcom-
panies that have developed a reputation for their R&D
capabilities and applied biotechnological research at
the scientiﬁc and technological frontier. Originally
basedonuniversityresearch,thisrelativelylargegroup
of about 300 new entrants to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry holds only a small share of less than 20% of
the total market share in this industry (Hagedoorn and
Roijakkers, 2002; Pisano et al., 1988; Van Vliet, 1998;
Walsh et al., 1995). Most of these small, new biotech-
nology ﬁrms are driven by innovations and laboratory
discoveries in a single therapeutic area and the result-
ing cash-ﬂow problems pose severe ﬁnancial limita-
tions to these companies (Lumerman Oliver and Porter
Liebeskind,1997).Also,theirinsufﬁcientmanagement
skills and the lack of production and marketing exper-
tise seem to prevent the large group of small biotech-
nologyﬁrmsfrombecomingamajorcompetitiveforce
in the high-tech pharmaceutical biotechnology indus-
try (Barley et al., 1992; Powell, 1996; Shan et al.,
1994).
2.1. Inter-ﬁrm partnerships between large
pharmaceutical companiesand s mall
biotechnology ﬁrms
In the above, we have positioned the global, high-
tech pharmaceutical biotechnology industry as an in-
dustry with a strong dual market structure with both
large pharmaceutical companies and large numbers of
small biotechnology ﬁrms. In the most recent decades,
the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry has wit-
nessed a sharply increasing frequency of inter-ﬁrm
partnerships between groups of pharmaceutical com-
panies and biotechnology ﬁrms (Hagedoorn and Roi-
jakkers, 2002; Powell, 1998; Powell et al., 2005;
Rothaermel, 2000). The existing, well-established lit-
erature on new partnership formation and repeated ties
(see e.g. Chung et al., 2000; Ciborra, 1991; Dyer and
Singh,1998;Gulati,1995;Hagedoorn,1993;Lundvall,
1993;Lyles,1994;Moweryetal.,1998;Mytelka,1991)
has pointed out that mutual dependence and equality
in speciﬁc pairs of cooperating companies, that are
more or less similar in terms of their core capabili-
ties, are important prerequisites for the occurrence of
repeated ties. In that context, previous research has in-
deed established that the likelihood of success of these
continued collaborative relationships between unique
pairs of companies hinges on the extent to which these
ﬁrms are ‘equals’ in terms of their interdependence,
their speciﬁc roles in the relationship, and the level of
their competencies (Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery et al.,
1998; Mytelka, 1991). In order to shed some light on
the possible consequences of a high-tech dual market
structure for new partnership formation and repeated
tiesbetweenlargepharmaceuticalcompaniesandsmall
biotechnology ﬁrms, we now turn to evaluate the spe-
ciﬁc nature of inter-ﬁrm relationships between large,
center companies and small, periphery ﬁrms in these
dual market structures.238 N. Roijakkerset al. / Res earch Policy 34 (2005) 235–245
Most contributions to the literature on high-tech
dual market structures have paid considerable atten-
tion to the particular relationship that exists between
groups of large, center companies and small, periph-
ery ﬁrms (see amongst others, Averitt, 1968; Sutton,
1998). In general, this relationship is characterized in
terms of the high level of dependence on the part of
small ﬁrms that typically function as economic satel-
lites of a single large company or a group of large
companies. On the basis of detailed contracts rather
than satellite ownership, large companies usually pro-
vide most of the funding for their satellites in return
for which these small ﬁrms supply their larger partners
withallkindsofservices,suchasR&D.Whereaslarge,
center companies maximize their operational ﬂexibil-
ity by engaging in a wide array of changing relation-
ships with large numbers of satellites, the very survival
of most of these small, single-product ﬁrms is highly
dependent on their limited number of ﬁnancial ties to
large companies (Averitt, 1968).
As indicated in the above, the vast majority of all
inter-ﬁrm partnerships in the high-tech pharmaceuti-
cal biotechnology industry are formed between large
pharmaceutical companies and small, R&D-intensive
biotechnology ﬁrms (Powell et al., 2005; Rothaermel,
2000).IntheselargenumbersofcontractualR&Dpart-
nerships, both groups of companies play very different
roles in the overall collaborative effort. While small
ﬁrms behave like external research laboratories or sup-
pliers of R&D services to large companies, the latter
companies act as an important source of income and
marketing expertise for small ﬁrms.
Besidesthesecleardifferencesinmanyoftheircore
activities, a relatively low level of mutual dependence
characterizes many R&D partnerships between large
pharmaceutical companies and small biotechnology
ﬁrms. Pharmaceutical companies typically use their
largenumbersofR&Dpartnershipswithsmallbiotech-
nology ﬁrms to scan their technological environment
and to collect information on new research topics
andinterestingnewtechnologicaldevelopments(Arora
and Gambardella, 1990; Audretsch, 2003; Hagedoorn,
1996; Powell et al., 1996). As many small, research-
intensive biotechnology ﬁrms concentrate on the same
or somewhat similar technologies, switching costs for
large pharmaceutical companies are relatively low. For
large pharmaceutical companies, it is less costly to
withdrawfromanunsatisfactorycollaborativerelation-
ship with a small biotechnology ﬁrm than it would be
to divest an acquired biotechnology ﬁrm that does not
bring the expected beneﬁts to the large company. Also,
small ﬁrms usually focus their research efforts on a
single therapeutic area, so the broader learning poten-
tial for large companies in their partnerships with each
individual small ﬁrm is very limited. In the high-tech
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, large compa-
nies are thus only partly dependent on small ﬁrms as a
group, but they are quite independent from individual
small ﬁrms. The position of individual small biotech-
nologyﬁrmsvis-` a-vislargepharmaceuticalcompanies,
however, is rather weak. For biotechnology ﬁrms, their
limited numbers of R&D partnerships with pharma-
ceutical companies are not so much part of a scanning
exercise, but a major source of funds and an important
element in their overall survival strategy (see Kenney,
1986; Powell et al., 2005; Saviotti, 1998).
Sofar,thegeneralideabehindmostanalysesofnew
partnership formation is that growing numbers of pre-
vious ties in speciﬁc pairs of cooperating companies,
that are mutually dependent and somewhat similar in
many of their activities, have a positive effect on their
subsequentpartnerships(seeamongstothers,Chunget
al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1993; Lundvall,
1993; Lyles, 1994; Mowery et al., 1998). By contrast,
wearguethat,giventheparticularcontextofahigh-tech
dual market structure where partners are substantially
different in terms of their size, capabilities, and their
speciﬁcrolesinthepartnership,pairsofcompaniesare
notlikelytoengageinlong-termrepeatedcollaborative
relationships. As the R&D capabilities of small ﬁrms
are typically restricted to a single technological area,
the resulting limited learning potential for large com-
panies in their partnerships with individual small ﬁrms
does not warrant an enduring cooperative relationship
basedonrepeatedties.Duringoneormorepartnerships
withanindividualsmallﬁrm,thelargecompanyisable
to access critical technological knowledge held by the
small ﬁrm and once it has absorbed this knowledge
thereisnolongeraneedtocontinuetherelationship.As
this particular high-tech dual market structure is char-
acterized by low switching costs,2 the large company
2 Asindicatedbyoneofthereferees,itisveryimportanttomention
at this point that we assume that the high-tech dual market structure
in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is characterized by the
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can easily terminate the relationship and turn to the
next partner. Or, to phrase this in a stronger statement:
given these limited opportunities for further partnering
in this dual market structure, the likelihood of repeated
inter-ﬁrm partnering is very small. This leads us to test
the following hypothesis:
H1. In a high-tech dual market structure, previous
ties in speciﬁc pairs of large and small companies are
expected to have a negative effect on the probability of
their future partnerships.
3. Methods
3.1. Data and sample
Our paper focuses on the international high-tech
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, an industry
where we ﬁnd large numbers of inter-ﬁrm R&D part-
nerships and where this particular form of inter-ﬁrm
collaboration is an important aspect of the behavior
of many companies (Barley et al., 1992; Powell et
al., 1996, 2005; Rothaermel, 2000). In order to test
our hypothesis, we constructed a dataset on unique
pairsofpharmaceuticalbiotechnologycompanieswith
R&D partnerships. This dataset was obtained from
the MERIT-CATI database, a comprehensive database
that contains information on R&D partnerships (see
Hagedoorn, 1996; Mowery et al., 1998). This database
contains information on each partnership and some in-
formation on companies participating in these partner-
ships.
We selected pairs of pharmaceutical biotechnology
companies that formed inter-ﬁrm R&D partnerships
during the period 1991–1998. In technical terms, what
we study are balanced panels, that is, all pairs of com-
panies in our sample were in the risk set during the
entire period of observation. This means that they are
assumed to have had the opportunity to form partner-
shipsduringtheentireperiod.Therefore,wehadtoex-
clude pairs with companies that were established since
1992andpairswithcompaniesthatceasedtoexistdur-
ing this period, either through a take-over or due to
bankruptcy. This procedure led to a sample of 34 pairs
ofpharmaceuticalbiotechnologycompaniesthatmight
cooperate through multiple R&D partnerships leading
to 272 observations.
3.2. Variables and statistical method
The dependent variable, R&D partnership forma-
tion, is a dichotomously coded variable for the occur-
rence of an inter-ﬁrm R&D partnership for each year
duringtheperiod1991–1998.Eachdependentvariable
takes the value of one when a pair of pharmaceuti-
calbiotechnologycompaniesenteredintoasubsequent
R&D partnership and the value of zero if this did not
occur.
The central independent variable, previousties ,
reﬂects the total number of all previous, common
R&D partnerships made between the pharmaceutical
biotechnology companies in a pair. This measure was
calculated until the end of the 5-year period preced-
ing the given year, so the starting year for measuring
this independent variable is 1986. We use this 5-year
moving window approach because only partnerships
formedduringthesefewpreviousyearsarelikelytoaf-
fectcurrentpartneringbehavior(seealsoGulati,1995).
This approach also enables us to control for possible
left censoring in the dataset. To verify the results of
thisapproach,wewillalsoapplyacumulativemethod.
This cumulative approach assumes that all partnering
activity, that has taken place before a given year, can
inﬂuence new R&D partnership formation.
We capture the clear presence of a strong high-tech
dual market structure in the pharmaceutical biotech-
nology industry by including a variable that expresses
size differences between the companies in a pair. This
variable records the total number of employees of the
largestcompanyinapairdividedbythetotalnumberof
employees of the smallest company in the pair. Small
biotechnology ﬁrms typically employ mainly R&D
specialists and therefore they have, compared to large
pharmaceutical companies, lower numbers of employ-
ees in many other functional areas, such as production,
marketing, distribution, etc. We therefore transformed
these size ratios into a logarithmic scale to account for
size differentials, which are unrelated to the R&D ac-
tivities of companies.
The intra-sector contractual nature of R&D part-
nerships is a variable that controls for the possible ef-
fect of the preference of pharmaceutical biotechnol-
ogy companies for contractual partnerships (i.e. R&D
pacts, joint development agreements, and R&D con-
tracts) or equity-based joint ventures on their subse-
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1998;Gulati,1995;OsbornandHagedoorn,1997).Itis
establishedthatmostoftherecentlyformedR&Dpart-
nerships in the high-tech pharmaceutical biotechnol-
ogy industry are of a contractual nature while there are
only few equity-based joint ventures (Roijakkers and
Hagedoorn, 2003). The degree to which pharmaceuti-
cal biotechnology companies have a clear preference
for forming contractual partnerships might affect their
future partnership formation that, in all likelihood, is
characterized by contractual agreements. This variable
measures the share of contractual partnerships in the
total number of pharmaceutical biotechnology R&D
partnerships in pairs of companies.
It is also well known from the literature (Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn, 1995) that high-tech compa-
nies typically use their R&D partnerships to diversify
their operations into new technological ﬁelds or new,
secondary product-markets. To the extent that phar-
maceutical biotechnology companies express a pref-
erence for contracts in the partnerships they form in
secondary product-markets, we expect this preference
toalsoaffecttheirpharmaceuticalbiotechnologyR&D
partnerships. We therefore include the variable inter-
sector contractual nature of partnerships to control for
the preference for contractual agreements in the part-
nershipsthatpharmaceuticalbiotechnologycompanies
establish outside their main industrial activity.
We also control for the intra-sector regional nature
of R&D partnerships as the share of regional partner-
shipsinthetotalnumberofpharmaceuticalbiotechnol-
ogyR&Dpartnershipsinpairsofcompanies.Regional
partnerships are registered according to the speciﬁc
geographic region (i.e. North America, Europe, Asia,
other regions) in which the headquarters of R&D part-
ners are located. The degree to which companies use
international partnerships as opposed to regional al-
liances is one of the most widely used control vari-
ables in this line of research. It refers to the role played
by international partnerships that seem quite different
fromalliancesthatareestablishedwithinregionaltrad-
ing blocks (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Contractor and
Lorange, 1988; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Companies do
not usually possess the same amount of information on
potential ‘foreign’ research partners as they would on
possible partners that are located within the same geo-
graphic region and the costs for obtaining information
on international partners are also much higher. Fur-
thermore, we include the variable inter-sector regional
nature of R&D partnerships to control for the share of
all regional partnerships in the total number of partner-
ships that pharmaceutical biotechnology companies in
a speciﬁc pair establish in other industries.
The variable growth is included in the analysis to
control for industry-wide trends and developments in
R&D partnership formation that are likely to have an
inﬂuence on the partnerships made between groups of
large pharmaceutical companies and small biotechnol-
ogyﬁrms.Manyauthors(seeamongstothers,Powellet
al.,2005;Rothaermel,2000;Saviotti,1998)havechar-
acterized the high-tech pharmaceutical biotechnology
industryasaverydynamicsectorwheretheserapidsci-
entiﬁc, technological, and industrial changes become
apparentintheextenttowhichpharmaceuticalbiotech-
nology companies form new R&D partnerships. This
variable records yearly, percentage changes in the to-
tal number of inter-ﬁrm R&D partnerships formed by
all companies active in the high-tech pharmaceutical
biotechnology industry.
Finally, we assume that the more years have passed
since pairs have formed their last R&D partnership,





We model R&D partnership formation by means
of Chamberlain’s (1984) ﬁxed-effects logit models
for panel data (see Baltagi, 1995; Heckman, 1981).
This method entails including a separate constant
term for each pair of pharmaceutical biotechnology
companies to control for possible, unobserved pair
effects.
4. Results
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for all
variables under study and it gives the correlations be-
tweenthesevariables.Obviously,someoftherelatively
high correlations indicate possible multi-collinearity,
inparticularbetweenthevariabledurationandprevious
ties(0.63).Therefore,wealsoestimatedaﬁxed-effects
logit model for panel data excluding the variable du-
ration. Table 2 displays the estimation results of these
logit models using LIMDEP 7.0. We report the results
of the moving window approach. The results of theN. Roijakkerset al. / Res earch Policy 34 (2005) 235–245 241
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable Mean S.D. 1234 5 6 7 8
R&D partnership formation 0.27 0.44 –
Previous ties 0.78 0.99 −0.04 –
Dual market structure 2.34 0.96 −0.05 −0.16 –
Intra-sector contractual nature 0.64 0.31 0.20 0.51 −0.27 –
Inter-sector contractual nature 0.36 0.26 0.18 0.29 −0.29 0.31 –
Intra-sector regional nature 0.35 0.27 0.07 0.35 −0.08 0.40 0.03 –
Inter-sector regional nature 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.17 −0.21 0.16 0.52 0.23 –
Growth 0.25 0.27 −0.11 −0.59 0.09 −0.42 −0.28 −0.23 −0.16 –
Duration 0.79 1.09 0.06 0.63 −0.09 0.50 0.22 0.25 0.16 −0.43
cumulative approach turned out to be not signiﬁcantly
different.
Theparticularhypothesistestedinthispaperargues
that previous ties in speciﬁc pairs of large and small
companies will have a negative effect on the likelihood
of their future R&D partnerships. In Table 2, models 1
and2showthatprevioustiesinuniquepairsofpharma-
ceutical biotechnology companies have a signiﬁcant,
negative inﬂuence on the probability that these ﬁrms
will enter into a new, common R&D partnership at a
later stage. Furthermore, the estimates of the speciﬁc
term that captures the clear presence of a high-tech
dual market structure in the pharmaceutical biotech-
nology industry are also negative and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero in both models (see also Table 2).
These results clearly suggest that previous ties in pairs
of large pharmaceutical companies and small biotech-
nology ﬁrms have the expected predicting power re-
garding the likelihood of subsequent partnerships of
these pairs. The analysis thus provides strong support
for the hypothesis proposed in this paper.
Following some other studies (Chung et al., 2000;
Gulati, 1995; Saxton, 1997), we undertook some ad-
ditional analysis including a squared term for previous
ties to detect a possible inverted U-shaped relationship
between this particular variable and the probability of
new R&D partnerships. It turned out, however, that,
unlike in most other studies, the effect of this squared
termwasinsigniﬁcant.Also,weincludedaninteraction
term between previous ties and dual market structure
into the model to examine the effect of such a term
on partnership formation. The effect of this interaction
variable was insigniﬁcant while the effects of the main
variables remained negative and signiﬁcant.
As far as the remaining control variables are con-
cerned, our ﬁndings show that in models 1 and 2
(see Table 2) the estimates of the variables that ex-
press the regional nature of R&D partnering and the
Table 2
Fixed-effects panel logit estimates
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Previous ties −1.076 (0.264)** −1.039 (0.250)**
Dual market structure −0.631 (0.333)* −0.633 (0.332)*
Intra-sector contractual nature 2.611 (0.803)** 2.697 (0.782)**
Inter-sector contractual nature 2.110 (1.066)* 2.098 (1.067)*
Intra-sector regional nature −0.645 (0.999) −0.658 (1.000)
Inter-sector regional nature −0.544 (1.291) −0.548 (1.288)




Standard errors in parentheses. N=number of observations. The dependent variable is 1 if the speciﬁc pair forms a subsequent R&D partnership
and 0 if not.
∗ Signiﬁcance-level at p<0.05.
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measuresofgrowthanddurationareinsigniﬁcantlydif-
ferentfromzero.However,inbothmodels,thecontrac-
tual nature of R&D partnerships does have a positive,
signiﬁcant effect on the future involvement in R&D
partnering of pairs of pharmaceutical biotechnology
companies.
5. Discussion and conclusions
This paper studies the particular relation between
previous ties in speciﬁc pairs of cooperating compa-
niesandthelikelihoodthatthesepairscontinuetobuild
on their collaborative relationship through a range of
repeated ties. The current, well-established literature
on the formation of new partnerships pays extensive
attention to the particular circumstances under which
pairs of cooperating companies are likely to continue
their partnerships through repeated ties (see Chung et
al.,2000;Ciborra,1991;DyerandSingh,1998;Gulati,
1995; Hagedoorn, 1993; Lundvall, 1993; Lyles, 1994;
Mowery et al., 1998; Mytelka, 1991). Speciﬁcally,
manyoftheseimportantcontributionshavearguedthat
mutual dependence, similarity, and equality in pairs of
companiesareimportantprerequisiteswithoutwhicha
long-term repeated collaborative relationship between
these companies is not likely to occur. Conform our
expectations the current research clearly shows that
prior R&D partnerships between pairs of large phar-
maceutical companies and small biotechnology ﬁrms
have a negative effect on the probability of subsequent
partnerships of these pairs. This result is in congru-
ence with the ﬁndings of Arora et al. (2001) who argue
that speciﬁc industry structures facilitate the develop-
ment of markets for technology (see also Audretsch,
2003). In such technology markets, inter-ﬁrm relation-
ships based on quasi-integration, such as repeated ties
and equity-based joint ventures, are not likely to oc-
cur. An interpretation of the negative role for previous
ties in new R&D partnership formation can thus be
found in the context of understanding the speciﬁcs of
large-small coalitions in a high-tech dual market struc-
ture such as found in the international, pharmaceutical
biotechnology industry (see also Averitt, 1968; Sutton,
1998).
As was previously mentioned, the vast majority of
all inter-ﬁrm R&D partnerships in the high-tech phar-
maceuticalbiotechnologyindustryareformedbetween
groups of large pharmaceutical companies and small
biotechnology ﬁrms (see amongst others, De Rond,
2003; Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2002; Powell, 1998;
Rothaermel, 2000). In our sample more than 70% of
thesepairsarelarge-smallcoalitions.Theselargephar-
maceutical companies typically provide their numer-
ous, smaller R&D partners with ﬁnancial support and
regulatoryknow-how,inreturnforwhichlargecompa-
nies acquire access to the research skills of these small
biotechnology ﬁrms (Arora and Gambardella, 1990;
Barley et al., 1992; Pisano, 1991; Powell, 1996; Pow-
ell et al., 2005; Shan et al., 1994).
At this point, it is also important to note that, in
thisparticularhigh-techindustry,largepharmaceutical
companiesusuallyhaveawidearrayofchangingR&D
partnerships, whereas most small biotechnology ﬁrms
have a limited number of partnerships. In our sample,
the average large pharmaceutical company had more
than 11 partnerships during the period 1991–1998; the
average small biotechnology ﬁrm had fewer than four
of these partnerships. The actual number of R&D part-
nerships of small ﬁrms is even substantially lower, due
to the necessarily strict selection criteria for our panel
data sample. As discussed in the above, we had to ex-
clude small biotechnology ﬁrms entering the industry
later during the period of analysis and small ﬁrms that
went bankrupt or that were taken over. These small
ﬁrms had even fewer R&D partnerships than the small
ﬁrms that were actually included in the sample.
So, small biotechnology ﬁrms are often highly de-
pendentontheirlimitednumberofﬁnancialtiestolarge
pharmaceutical companies3 through which they can
3 The ﬁnancial dependence of small ﬁrms on their large partners
was particularly high during the period of analysis (1986–1998), be-
cause of a severe lack of venture capital during these years. After a
clear peak in the availability of venture capital in the ﬁrst half of the
1980s (Hakansson et al., 1993; Senker, 1996; Walsh et al., 1995),
the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry witnessed a decreasing
availability of venture capital as from 1987 onwards. During the
ﬁnal years of the 1980s, venture capitalists became increasingly pes-
simistic about the commercialization potential of biotechnology and
their interest to invest in small ﬁrms began to wane (Barley et al.,
1992;GalambosandSturchio,1998).Inthoseyears,largecompanies
became the single largest source of funding for small ﬁrms (Senker
and Sharp, 1997). With the maturation of biotechnology, several im-
portant contributions (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Powell et al., 2002)
have signaled another increase in the availability of venture capital
towards the end of the 1990s. Although the effects of this increase
were not yet noticeable during the period of analysis, the currentN. Roijakkerset al. / Res earch Policy 34 (2005) 235–245 243
ensure their very survival. Large companies frequently
enterintonumerousR&Dpartnershipswithsmallﬁrms
in order to learn from many different sources of tech-
nology and to stay current with respect to the latest
scientiﬁc and technological developments (Arora and
Gambardella, 1990; Hagedoorn, 1996; Kenney, 1986;
Powell et al., 1996, 2005; Saviotti, 1998). Once the
large pharmaceutical company has absorbed critical
knowledge from an individual, smaller research part-
ner, there is no need to continue its partnership with
thesmallerbiotechnologicalﬁrmthroughrepeatedties.
As the smaller ﬁrm is concentrating its research efforts
in a speciﬁc therapeutic area (Averitt, 1968; Bowring,
1986), it may take years before this ﬁrm has managed
to switch to a different ﬁeld. Alternatively, it may take
years before its novel research in the current area has
reached a phase where it is once again commercially
viable for the large company to enter into a new R&D
partnership with its former partner.4 The clear lack of
incentives to enter into long-term repeated collabora-
tive relationships for groups of large pharmaceutical
companies and small biotechnology ﬁrms can thus be
very well explained within the particular context of a
high-tech dual market structure. In this particular mar-
ketstructure,researchpartnersareverydissimilarwith
respect to their interdependence, size, capabilities, and
both groups of companies play a completely different
role in R&D partnerships.
A large part of the existing alliance literature, dis-
cussed in the above, suggests that previous ties in pairs
of cooperating companies are an important stimulus
for subsequent partnership formation. Although the
current contribution does not discard the accepted un-
derstanding of inter-ﬁrm partnering and the role of re-
peated ties, it does point at the critical importance of
takingthespeciﬁcindustrialcontextintoconsideration
when studying repeated ties. Particularly, an explana-
population of small ﬁrms might be somewhat less in need of large
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial support.
4 Because the current research is based on a balanced panel, the
small ﬁrms in our sample did not ﬁle for bankruptcy or become a
target for acquisition during the period of analysis. As from 1998
onwards, a number of these ﬁrms may have been taken over by their
former,largepartners(seealsoSenker,1998).However,thepercent-
ageofsuchacquisitionsislikelytobeverylowasrelatedresearchby
Hagedoorn and Sadowski (1999) has shown that two companies that
were previously cooperating in R&D hardly ever become integrated
through mergers or acquisitions.
tion of our ﬁndings within the context of the high-tech
pharmaceuticalbiotechnologyindustrycouldbeexem-
plary for an understanding of the importance of re-
peated ties in high-tech industries. Therefore, it seems
interesting for future work to focus on the effect of
previous ties on inter-ﬁrm partnering within the con-
text of other high-tech industries with diverging dual
market structures and speciﬁc groups of cooperating
companies. It also seems important for future stud-
ies of the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry to
examine repeated ties between large pharmaceutical
companies and small biotechnology ﬁrms in light of
the increasing availability of venture capital in recent
years.
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